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Daniel P. O’Gorman

Learned Hand and the Objective Theory of Contract
Interpretation
18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 63 (2019)

A B S T R A C T . When scholars discuss Judge Learned Hand’s approach to contract interpretation,
they refer to him as a “great formalist commercial lawyer” who was a “pure objectivist” exhibiting
a “crusader’s zeal” for the objective theory of contract. He is identified as a leading advocate of
the classical approach to contract interpretation, which dominated American law in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But Hand’s reputation—built from three of his
opinions—clashes with his reputation as a pre-Realist critic of formalism and as an intentionalist
in statutory interpretation. This Article explores just how far Hand applied a strict objective
approach to contract interpretation and whether the three famous opinions responsible for his
reputation portray a somewhat misleading—or at least incomplete—picture of Hand’s approach
to contract interpretation. This Article concludes that while Hand did seem to exhibit a zeal for
the objective theory of contract, his approach to contract interpretation was more modern than
one would expect from a so-called great commercial formalist lawyer with a crusader’s zeal for the
objective theory.
A U T H O R . Associate Professor, Barry University School of Law. J.D., New York University, 1993;
B.A., University of Central Florida, 1990. The author is indebted to Dean Leticia M. Diaz for
providing a research grant on behalf of Barry University School of Law, without which this
Article would not have been possible.
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I N T R OD U C T I ON

When scholars discuss Judge Learned Hand’s approach to contract
interpretation, they refer to him as a “great formalist commercial lawyer”1 who was
a “pure objectivist”2 exhibiting a “crusader’s zeal” for the objective theory of
contract.3 He is identified, along with Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
and Professor Samuel Williston, as a leading advocate of the classical approach to
contract interpretation, which dominated American law in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.4
Hand’s reputation comes primarily from three of his opinions, two written
early in his career when he was a trial judge and the third when he was an appellate

1

Stewart Macaulay, Transcript of Panel Discussion—Transactional Economics: Victor Goldberg’s
Framing Contract Law, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev. 469, 476 (2007).

2

Kevin M. Teeven, A History of the Anglo-American Common Law of Contract 276 n.
175 (Greenwood Press 1990).

3

E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939, 943 (1967).

4

Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”: The Failure of the Contract Analogy
in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1145, 1157 (1998); see also Lawrence Kalevitch, Contract, Will,
and Social Practice, 3 J. L. & Pol 379, 382 (1995) (referring to “the defeat of the consensualists and
the estoppelists of the late nineteenth century at the hands of Holmes, Hand and Williston and
their objective theory of contracts.”).
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judge. The first was Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of N.Y.5 in 1911, which included the
following memorable passage, considered a classic statement of the objective theory
of contract:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent
of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known
intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used
the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes
upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something
else of the sort.6

The second was Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., in 1917.7 Hand’s
opinion included a passage reminiscent of his dictum in Hotchkiss:
It is quite true that we commonly speak of a contract as a question of intent, and for
most purposes it is a convenient paraphrase, accurate enough, but, strictly speaking,
untrue. It makes not the least difference whether a promisor actually intends that
meaning which the law will impose upon his words. The whole House of Bishops might
satisfy us that he had intended something else, and it would make not a particle of
difference in his obligation. That obligation the law attaches to his act of using certain
words, provided, of course, the actor be under no disability. The scope of those words
will, in the absence of some convention to the contrary, be settled, it is true, by what the
law supposes men would generally mean when they used them; but the promisor’s
conformity to type is not a factor in his obligation. Hence it follows that no declaration
of the promisor as to his meaning when he used the words is of the slightest relevancy,
however formally competent it may be as an admission. Indeed, if both parties severally

5

Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. Mechanics’
Metals Nat. Bank of City of N.Y., 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l City Bank v. Hotchkiss,
231 U.S. 50 (1913).
6

Id. at 293; see also G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 433, 440
n.33 (1993) (referring to the dictum as “a classic expression of the objective view of
contract”); Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841,
903 n.350 (1990) (referring to it as “the classic statement of [the objective theory’s] effect”); Wendell
H. Holmes, The Freedom Not to Contract, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 751, 798 n.3 (1986) (referring to it as the
“classic formulation of the objective theory of contract”). In Williston’s 1920 contracts treatise, he
cited Hand’s dictum for the proposition that “[i]n regard to both torts and contracts, the law, not
the parties, fixes the requirements of a legal obligation.” Samuel Williston, The Law of
Contracts § 21, at 22 (1st ed. 1920). He also quoted the passage in full as the “sound view” as to
whether a misunderstanding between the parties will prevent the formation of a contract. Id. §
94, at 176. In 1946, Judge Jerome N. Frank of the Second Circuit wrote a concurring opinion that
included a lengthy and scathing attack on the objective theory of contract, and cited to Hotchkiss
as an example a judicial pronouncement advocating for “complete ‘objectivity’ in contract.”
Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 762 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring).
7

Eustis Mining Co v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
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declared that their meaning had been other than the natural meaning, and each
declaration was similar, it would be irrelevant, saving some mutual agreement between
them to that effect. When the court came to assign the meaning to their words, it would
disregard such declarations, because they related only to their state of mind when the
contract was made, and that has nothing to do with their obligations.8

The third was James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. in 1933, in which Hand refused to
infer from an offer a promise to keep the offer open, even though the promisor knew
the promisee had to detrimentally rely on the offer to put itself in a position to
accept the offer.9 Hand famously wrote that “in commercial transactions it does not
in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do
not protect themselves.”10
But Hand’s reputation as a great commercial formalist lawyer with a crusader’s
zeal for the objective theory of contract—stemming from these three opinions—
clashes with his reputation as a pre-Realist critic of formalism11 and as an
intentionalist in statutory interpretation.12 This Article thus seeks to determine just
how far Hand, in his court opinions, applied a strict objective approach to contract
interpretation and whether the three famous opinions responsible for his
reputation portray a somewhat misleading—or at least incomplete—picture of
Hand’s approach to contract interpretation.
Part I of this Article provides a brief biographical sketch of Hand, paying

8

Id. at 984–85.

9

James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933); see also Avery Katz, When Should an
Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Contract Negotiations, 105 Yale L.J. 1249, 1261
(referring to James Baird Co. as “one of Judge Hand's most celebrated opinions and a warhorse of
the casebooks.”).

10

James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346.

11

See Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 473, 506
(2003) (identifying Hand as a pre-Realist critic of formalism); see also G. Edward White, The
American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges 267 (1988) (“In the early
years of the [twentieth] century [Hand’s] insistence that judges were free, within limits, to be
creative identified him with Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, and other critics of both mechanical
jurisprudence and what Hand called the ‘dictionary school’ of literalist statutory interpretation.”)
(footnote omitted).
12

See Movsesian, supra note 4, at 1191 & n.101 (noting Hand’s approach to contract
interpretation and then stating, “Interestingly, Hand took an intentionalist approach to statutory
interpretation.”); Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 Harv. L.
Rev. 370, 376 (1947) (“When Judge Hand went on the bench, the literalism demanded by
conservative tradition was in ascendancy, and but few cases were not adjudged according to the
words of the statute on the ground that they had a plain meaning not to be altered without judicial
legislation. This attitude Judge Hand unequivocally rejected.”).
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particular attention to any influences his background might have had on his
approach to contract interpretation. Part II discusses formalism and the prevailing
approach to contract interpretation in the early twentieth century when Hand was
appointed to the federal bench. Part III is a brief summary of Hand’s approach to
the objective theory of contract interpretation, based on an analysis of his opinions.
Part IV analyzes Hand’s most important opinions regarding contract
interpretation, providing support for the summary in Part III. Part V is a brief
conclusion, explaining that Hand’s reputation as a great commercial formalist
lawyer with a crusader’s zeal for the objective theory of contract is an overly
simplistic view of his approach to contract interpretation.
I.

B I OG R A P H I C A L B A C K G R OU N D

Hand was born Billings Learned Hand in 1872 in Albany, New York.13 He
attended Harvard University from 1889 to 1893, and as an undergraduate studied
psychology under the future pragmatist William James, who taught Hand that there
were no unchallengeable truths, only questions.14 James seems to have had a strong
influence on Hand, as throughout Hand’s life he would have a philosophy of
skepticism and suspicion of absolutes close to James’s.15
In 1893, Hand entered Harvard Law School.16 While in law school, he studied
contracts under Samuel Williston,17 who would become the greatest contracts
scholar of his time and who is considered the architect of classical contract law.18
Williston would also come to be considered the greatest law teacher of his time.19
The Willistonian model of contract law was grounded on the centrality of written
agreements entered into voluntarily, with courts playing a limited role in enforcing
and interpreting those agreements20 and was based on the assumption that
13

The Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law 248 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009)
[hereinafter Yale Biographical Dictionary].

14

Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 33, 36 (1994).

15

Id. at 37 n.*; see also id. at 35 (“What struck the most responsive chord in Learned was James’s
distrust of absolutes, his doubts about metaphysics, and his emphasis on the empirical . . . .”).

16

Id. at 43.

17

Id. at 47 & n.187; see also Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography 314 (1941)
(identifying Hand as Williston’s former pupil).
18

Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 207, 208 (2005).

19

See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, In Memoriam: Samuel Williston, 49 A.B.A. J. 362, 362 (1963) (noting
that “Williston was, by common consent, the greatest law teacher of his time”).
20

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J.
541, 549 (2003).
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contracts often have a plain meaning.21 Williston also believed courts, when
interpreting a contract, should not consider what the parties said to each other
about the contract’s meaning or what the parties subjectively believed the contract
meant.22
Studying contract law under Williston, one might expect to find that the famed
professor’s formalist approach to contract law, coupled with his considerable
teaching abilities, exerted a strong intellectual influence on Hand. But while Hand
held legal scholars in high esteem,23 he did not succumb to hero worship and he
perceived both his teachers’ strengths and weaknesses.24 For example, he was
critical of Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell’s formalist approach to legal
reasoning,25 and he preferred professors who combined the use of logic with
wisdom and judgment.26 And Williston’s teaching style greatly emphasized using
logic to reach the correct result.27 One commentator described Williston’s
classroom exchanges as follows: “When he had finished with the beautiful structure
of one of his platonic interchanges on the law of contracts, the student saw the
inevitability of the result, as Williston had intended that he should.”28
While Hand portrayed Williston “as an example of his own preferred model of
tempering the search for logical constructs with breadth, sensitivity to reality, and
humanity,”29 his other reflections suggest Williston was too rigid and theoretical for
him. He wrote:
[H]e was so secure in his thinking, so prepared to encounter dissidence and gently
dispose of it, that one wondered what was the perfect mechanism that his skull
enclosed. He seemed to be indifferent as to the effect of law, measured in human values, so long
as it was consistent and clear.30

21

Id. at 572; see also id. at 619 n.53 (“Willistonian formalism rest[ed] on two basic claims: (1) that
contract terms can be interpreted according to their plain meanings, and (2) that written terms
have priority over unwritten expressions of agreement.”).

22

Joseph M. Perillo, Perillo on Contracts 132 (6th ed. 2009).

23

Gunther, supra note 14, at 413.

24

Id. at 47.

25

Id. at 46.

26

Id. at 47.

27

Id.

28

Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 1817–1967, at
217 (1967).
29

Gunther, supra note 14, at 48.

30

Id. at 49 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to A. James Casner, Nov. 10, 1959) (emphasis
added).
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He also wrote of Williston: “[H]is serene intelligence [was] unshaken by dissent. In
[the] classroom it were best not to cross swords with him, unless you were a master
yourself, which no one was in my time.”31 Thus, unlike the tremendous influence
Professor James Bradley Thayer had on Hand’s approach to judicial review as a
result of a third-year constitutional law course,32 Hand’s reflections suggest
Williston’s teaching did not have a notable impact on his future approach to
contract law.
In fact, perhaps more important to Hand’s future approach to contract law was
Thayer.33 Thayer, for example, believed that the parol evidence rule was based on
the idea that the parties intended prior agreements and negotiations to merge into
the written contract and be superseded if not included,34 an important rationale for
the rule that Hand followed as a judge, as will be discussed.
Hand graduated from Harvard Law School in 1896,35 and his biographer
summed up Hand’s law-school experience as follows:
Hand drew important “legal lessons,” guidelines that would serve him well as lawyer
and judge: a mix of conservatism and innovativeness, a loyal regard for legal traditions
combined with an awareness that the legacy must be used “flexibly,” a recognition that
the function of judges is confined but not uncreative, and a perception that “orderly
change” is essential if civilization is not to perish “either by atrophy, or by convulsion.”36

After Hand graduated from law school, he practiced law in Albany (and also
dropped his first name).37 He, unfortunately, found his work there to be routine and
unchallenging, and in 1902, he moved to New York City and started practicing at a
Wall Street firm.38 But he found his work at the new firm to be mundane—
“administration of some old estates, insolvency claims, dull commercial

31

Id. (quoting Learned Hand Memo for Williston, Harvard Law School Bulletin, January 1949,

8).
32

See Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248 (“At Harvard Law School, class of
1896, he heard James Bradley Thayer’s skepticism about judicial review, which made an indelible
impression.”).

33

Gunther, supra note 14, at 51 (noting that Hand first encountered Thayer in a second-year
evidence course).

34

James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 409
(1898).
35

Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248.

36

Gunther, supra note 14, at 52.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 101.
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matters”39—and in 1904 accepted a position at Gould & Wilkie, another Wall Street
firm,40 where he became a partner.41 He did not, however, achieve much success as
an attorney and was unhappy,42 ultimately considering his years as a lawyer to have
been a failure.43
Nothing about Hand’s years as a lawyer suggest they created in him any
particular zeal to defend commercial interests. During his years in practice he
became more interested in politics than he had been (though he was by no means
an activist), but rather than the political philosophy one would expect from a
commercial formalist lawyer, he supported a mixture of socialism and laissezfaire.44 He wrote that “‘in a vast multitude of cases the State must and
should . . . modify the contractual relations which [individuals] assume toward one
another.’”45 Thus, he did not believe in unbridled freedom of contract and, for
example, considered it necessary for the government to regulate for the safety and
health of women and children in factories.46 He opposed the concentration of
economic power in large companies47 and supported curbing the abuses of
economic power.48
Far from being a zealot for freedom of contract, in 1908 Hand wrote an article
published in the Harvard Law Review criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
several years earlier in Lochner v. New York,49 in which the Court held
unconstitutional on freedom of contract grounds a law limiting the hours of
bakers.50 Hand believed that “no one can with justice apply to the concrete problems
39

Id. at 102.

40

Id. at 104.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 105–06.

43

Id. at 107; see also White, supra note 11, at 261 (1988) (“He was not comfortable as a law
practitioner, either in Albany, where he worked from 1896 to 1902, or in New York City, where he
practiced until his 1909 appointment to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York.”); Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248 (noting that he had
“middling” success practicing law in Albany and New York City).
44

See Gunther, supra note 14, at 62.

45

Id. (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to Augustus Hand (Nov. 6, 1898)).

46

Id. at 62–63.

47

Id. at 110.

48

Id. at 114.

49

Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495 (1908).

50

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
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the yardstick of abstract economic theory,”51 and the only way in which the value of
the law could be shown was by experiment, and the legislature was “the only public
representative really fitted to experiment.”52 He wrote that “it is too late for the
adherents of a strict laissez faire to condemn any law for the sole reason that it
interferes with the freedom of contract.”53 Hand accused the justices of
implementing their economic biases,54 and he showed support for the government
interfering with freedom of contract to correct the abuses of unequal bargaining
power, writing:
For the state to intervene to make more just and equal the relative strategic advantages
of the two parties to the contract, of whom one is under the pressure of absolute want,
while the other is not, is as proper a legislative function as that it should neutralize the
relative advantages arising from fraudulent cunning or from superior physical force.55

Later, in 1921, in correspondence Hand and Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter
agreed that the “damned Bill of Rights” had permitted judges to put their laissez
faire economic biases into the Constitution.56
Because of his unhappiness practicing law, Hand sought to obtain a federal
judgeship.57 His first attempt came in 1907, but it was unsuccessful.58 His second
attempt—in 1909—succeeded.59 His friends in New York admired his independent
mind,60 which had been displayed in his article criticizing Lochner,61 and Hand was
fortunate that the national administration wanted to nominate an independent
intellectual.62 In New York, he had met the influential Charles C. Burlingham, a
lawyer and reformer who advocated for better quality judges, and Burlingham
recommended Hand to U.S. Attorney General George W. Wickersham for a
judgeship.63 In 1909, President William Howard Taft appointed Hand to the federal

51

Hand, supra note 49, at 507.

52

Id. at 508.

53

Id. at 502.

54

Id. at 508.

55

Id. at 506.

56

Gunther, supra note 14, at 373.

57

See id. at 106.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 107; Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248.

60

Gunther, supra note 14, at 107.

61

Id. at 123.

62

Id. at 107.

63

Id. at 107–08.
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trial court in the Southern District of New York.64
Hand served as a federal trial judge for fifteen years,65 during which time he
earned a reputation among other judges as a great jurist.66 New York’s economic
and intellectual importance and Hand’s original and clear writing style helped gain
him this reputation.67 As early as the 1920s, and before being appointed to the
Second Circuit, Justice Holmes recommended his appointment to the U.S. Supreme
Court.68 In 1925, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo (then a judge on the New York Court of
Appeals) ranked Hand among the two or three judges he considered close to Holmes
in his esteem,69 and in the same year Hand was introduced at the annual meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools as “an idol of the bench.”70
In 1922, Hand’s reputation was such that he was invited to join the Committee
on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the
Law, a committee with nearly forty members and “a virtual Who’s Who of leaders of
the profession.”71 The committee founded the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1923,
which sought “to help make certain much that is now uncertain and to simplify
unnecessary complexities, but also to promote those changes which will tend better
to adapt the laws to the needs of life.”72 Although the ALI’s original aim included
“adapt[ing] the laws to the needs of life,” Hand supported the ALI’s self-imposed
restraint of articulating the law “as it is,” rather than articulating the law as the ALI
thought it should be.73 Hand believed that the ALI should “restate, not legislate,” his
biographer noting that “just as he was opposed to unelected courts dictating public
policy, so was he critical of a legal elite’s substituting its dictates for democratic
choices on contentious issues.”74

64

Id. at 132.

65

White, supra note 11, at 253.

66

Id. at 263. But see Jerome M. Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev.
666, 675 (1957) (stating with respect to Hand’s trial-court years, “[e]xcept for a few articles and
some notable judicial opinions, he would have been known for his efforts in those years to few
other than the New York Bar.”).
67

White, supra note 11, at 264.

68

Id. at 263.

69

Id.

70

Gunther, supra note 14, at 414.

71

Id. at 410.

72

American Law Institute, Report of the Committee 14 (1923).

73

Gunther, supra note 14, at 412.

74

Id.
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Over the years, Hand was a faithful attendee at ALI meetings,75 but there is little
evidence that the ALI’s work on the Restatement of Contracts,76 published in 1932, made
an impact on Hand’s approach to contract interpretation. Hand was not on the
Committee on Contracts,77 and he rarely cited to the Restatements in his judicial
opinions.78 His involvement with the ALI did show, however, that he desired greater
clarity in the common law. As noted by his biographer, he had a “concern with
clarifying the legal framework [and] [d]uring most of his years on the bench, Hand
confronted a body of law that ranged from useless generalizations to annoying
technicalities.”79
In 1924, shortly after joining the ALI, Hand was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court on which he would sit until his
death in 1961.80 He served as a federal judge for fifty-two years, writing about 3,000
opinions.81 Although never appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Second
Circuit provided Hand with an opportunity to hear important cases involving
sizable sums of money argued by members of one of the country’s leading bars.82
In 1929, not long after his appointment to the Second Circuit, Hand became a
founding member of the National Advisory Committee of the Institute of Law at
Johns Hopkins University, an organization dedicated to promoting empirical
social-science research in the law.83 In a letter to the University’s president, Hand
displayed an interest in studying the law in action, writing: “We are still largely
living in adolescent dogmas, uncriticized, often emanating from purposes of which
we are but dimly conscious. The Institute would at least make us aware of our
assumptions; that is much.”84
Hand’s approach to judging has been described as combining creativity and
restraint,85 and seeking to “retain and revive the longstanding canon that judges

75

Id. at 410–11.

76

Id. at 413.

77

See Restatement (First) of Contracts vi (Am. Law. Inst. 1932) (listing the committee
members).

78

Gunther, supra note 14, at 413.

79

Id. at 313.

80

Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248; Gunther, supra note 14, at 679.

81

Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248.

82

White, supra note 11, at 276.

83

Gunther, supra note 14, at 408–09.

84

Id. at 409.

85

White, supra note 11, at 285.
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were never truly free to decide in accordance with their personal views.”86 But at
the same time, for him “[i]t was not enough to base a decision on outdated formulas
and on legal clichés; throughout his career he sought to adapt the law to the rapid
changes in society and industry.”87 Skeptical of absolute truths, the pragmatism he
had learned from William James as an undergraduate student stuck with him—“the
philosophy that ideas derive meaning from their practical consequences.”88 And it
was this pragmatism that was perhaps his most memorable attribute and most
significant contribution to judging.89
During his judicial career, Hand rejected two extreme schools of
jurisprudence—one was what he called the “dictionary school” that interpreted
statutes literally and the other was the view that the judge should disregard the law
(his view of Legal Realism).90 Hand took a middle path, believing that legal
doctrines contained elements of myth and fiction and that subjectivity was an
important element of judging, and involved an attempt to weigh unquantifiable
values.91 With respect to statutory interpretation, he rejected the prevalent view in
the late nineteenth century that courts should limit interpretation to the ordinary
or plain meaning of a statute.92 Rather, he sought to find a middle ground between
the dictionary school and Realism by focusing on the statute’s purpose.93
Hand’s background and his general approach to judging thus suggests that,
with respect to the law of contract interpretation, he would desire to clarify the rules
of interpretation. At the same time, Hand understood that general statements of
law cannot always determine outcomes in particular cases. Hand would reject the
belief that the language used by the parties can have a plain meaning outside of the
context in which it is used, and he would take account of the parties’ purpose in
entering into the contract. This Article will turn to Hand’s approach to contract
interpretation after a brief survey of formalism and the law of contract
interpretation at the turn of the twentieth century, inasmuch as Hand’s approach
to contract interpretation is viewed as quintessentially formalistic.
86

Id. at 291.

87

Marvin Schick, Learned Hand’s Court 189 (1970).

88

Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 249.

89
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I I . C ON T R A C T I N T E R P R E T A T I ON A T T H E T U R N OF T H E T WE N T I E T H
CENTURY

From the mid-nineteenth century through the First World War, the
predominant mode of legal thinking was referred to as “formalism” or “mechanical
jurisprudence,” now referred to as “classical legal thought.”94 Formalists believed
that specific legal rules and court opinions could be traced to a few basic principles,
which in turn could be linked to a few fundamental concepts, in particular the
concept of respecting the will or autonomy of legal authorities, as well as private
contracting parties.95 Classical legal thought was thus associated with the economic
principle of laissez faire.96 This association of laissez faire and classical legal
thought was reinforced by courts believing that the “right to property” and the “right
to contract” were constitutionally protected by a person’s autonomy.97 Thus,
scholars and judges supporting social legislation criticized the reasoning of judges
using classical legal thought.98
During this era, there also arose what is referred to as “classical contract law.”99
Classical contract law is most commonly associated with Holmes and Williston,
with Holmes providing the theory’s broad outlines in 1881 in his book The Common
Law and Williston the details in 1920 in his treatise The Law of Contracts.100 Its highwater mark is associated with the publication of the Restatement of Contracts in 1932,
with Williston as its reporter.101 By that point, however, formalism had been under
attack from the Legal Realists, and the publication of the Restatements is viewed by
some as a life-support effort to save formalism,102 a “last long-drawn-out gasp of a

94

David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, Introduction to The Canon of American Legal
Thought 8–9 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, eds., 2006) [hereinafter Canon].
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Id. at 9.
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Id. at 10.
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Id.
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Id.
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Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 678, 681 (1984).

100

Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 6 & n.4, 15 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995);
see also Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 Hastings L.J. 1191,
1193 (1998) (“Gilmore attributed the essential shape of classical contract law to three Harvard law
professors: Langdell, Holmes and Williston. By 1880, the first two members of triumvirate of
classical architects were already busily sketching the outlines of what would become the generally
accepted structure of American contract law.”).
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See Knapp, supra note 100, at 1193–94; see also Restatement (First) of Contracts, supra note
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dying tradition.”103 Professor Grant Gilmore believed that the Restatement of
Contracts was itself schizophrenic, “poised between past and future.”104 This early
twentieth century assault on classical contract law would be led by Professor Arthur
L. Corbin of Yale Law School, starting with a series of articles in the early twentieth
century.105
Reminiscent of formalism, classical contract law was a general theory that
applied to all types of contracts, rather than having separate theories for different
types of contracts.106 This process of creating a general theory of contract law is
traced to Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School, and his
1880 contracts casebook.107 It continued throughout the era of classical legal
thought, with Holmes’s efforts in The Common Law, Williston’s treatise, and the
Restatement of Contracts. Holmes in the late nineteenth century sought not only to
make sense of contract law, but of the common law as a whole.108 In Williston’s
introduction to his 1920 treatise, he wrote that the law of contracts “tends from its
very size to fall apart,” and asserted that “[i]t therefore seems desirable to treat the
subject of contracts as a whole, and to show the wide range of application of its
principles.”109 The ALI’s desire to restate the rules of the common law was designed
to “clarify and simplify the law and to render it more certain . . . .”110 The ALI stated
that “the vast and ever increasing volume of the decisions of the courts establishing
new rules or precedents, and the numerous instances in which the decisions are
irreconcilable has resulted in ever increasing uncertainty in the law.”111 Thus,
classical contract law valued certainty.
Consistent with a desire for certainty, classical contract law preferred bright-

103

Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 833
(1935).

104

Gilmore, supra note 100, at 71-72.
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See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis
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1918 . . . .”).
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See Lawrence M. Friedman, Contract Law in America: A Social and Economic Case
Study 20–24 (1965).
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Gilmore, supra note 100, at 13.
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See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881).
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111

Id.

76

LEARNED HAND AND THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

line rules to vague standards,112 the former having the benefit of restraining official
arbitrariness.113 This preference for rules over standards, and the desire for
certainty, included preferring written documents to oral terms, and was manifested
in doctrines such as the plain meaning rule and the parol evidence rule.114
These bright-line rules were to be derived through deduction from abstract,
axiomatic principles.115 And these principles were based on the idea of freedom of
contract, the idea that individuals should have the power to enter into contracts and
have the government enforce them without significant qualifications.116 They were
also, however, based on the idea of freedom from contract, in the sense that parties
should not have contractual obligations imposed upon them to which they had not
assented.117
While classical contract law might have been premised on the principle or
policy of freedom of (and from) contract, adherents had different reasons for
supporting it. Some considered it based on the natural law theory of liberalism, and
an inalienable right to own property and dispose of it as you wished, in the sense
that freedom of contract (and freedom from contract) was a fundamental right
based on the right to autonomy.118 This was known as the “will theory of contract.”119
With respect to freedom of contract, it resembled a Kantian approach to being

112

See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham
L. Rev. 761, 767 (2002).
113

Canon, supra note 94, at 633 (“It has been common ground, at least since Ihering, that the
two great social virtues of formally realizable rules, as opposed to standards or principles, are the
restraint of official arbitrariness and certainty.”).

114

See Knapp, supra note 112, at 767.
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See id.; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is no Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 805, 805 (2000) (“Classical contract law was axiomatic in nature. Axiomatic theories of law
take as a premise that fundamental doctrinal propositions can be established on the ground that
they are self-evident.”).
116

See Knapp, supra note 112, at 767.
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See Lucas S. Osborn, The Leaky Common Law: An “Offer to Sell” as a Policy Tool in Patent Law and
Beyond, 53 Santa Clara L. Rev. 143, 147 (2013) (“[T]raditional contract law also seeks to ensure that
individuals are free from having contractual obligations imposed on them unexpectedly. This
freedom may be referred to as ‘freedom from contract’ . . . .”).
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See W. David Slawson, Binding Promises: The Late 20th-Century Reformation of
Contract Law 10–11 (1996); P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 8–13
(1979) (discussing English judges).
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See Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 575 (1933) (discussing the will
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morally responsible for your actions,120 and was premised on a move away from
paternalism and toward individualism, the idea that people could be trusted to look
out for themselves.121 Coupled with this was the notion that compelled sharing and
sacrifice should be restricted (freedom from contract).122 This led to a system of
contract law under which it was hard to form a contract, but once formed it was
hard to avoid.123
But classical contract law was also based on the policy of the free market,124 and
based on the benefits of competition and the freedom of parties to set prices and
other contract terms.125 Unlike the principle of autonomy, this was a utilitarian
policy to increase social welfare.126 For example, Holmes in his 1897 article The Path
of the Law openly accepted utilitarianism as law’s goal.127
One of the features of classical contract law was the objective theory of
contract,128 which “holds that the intentions of the parties to a contract or alleged
contract are to be ascertained from their words and conduct rather than their
unexpressed intentions.”129 Holmes was a particularly strong advocate of the
objective theory of contract.130 He wrote in The Common Law that “the making of a
contract does not depend on the state of the parties’ minds, it depends on their overt
acts”131 and that “[t]he law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties’

120

See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 1104 n.322
(2001) (equating the will theory with Kantianism).
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Atiyah, supra note 118, at 8–10.

122
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(1976).
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Fordham L. Rev. 427, 427 (2000).
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minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their
conduct.”132 In 1897, in his famous article The Path of the Law, Holmes wrote that “the
making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention,
but on the agreement of two sets of external signs—not on the parties having meant
the same thing but on their having said the same thing.”133
Scholars disagree on whether the objective theory arose in the late nineteenth
century or whether it has older origins. One view is that there was a shift in the late
nineteenth century from a subjective theory to an objective theory based on the
reasonable expectations of the promisee.134 The reason for the ascendency
(according to this view) was that as transactions increasingly occurred between
strangers, the need to rely on the other party’s external manifestations increased.135
Support for this reason is based on contemporary writers such as Parsons, Langdell,
Holmes, and Williston noting commerce’s need for predictability.136
The other view, which was advocated by Professor Joseph M. Perillo, is that the
objective theory of contract has predominated in the common law since time
immemorial, with a “brief but almost inconsequential flirtation with subjective
approaches in the mid-nineteenth century.”137 Perillo argued that this brief
flirtation with a subjective approach came to an end—and the modern era of the
objective theory ushered in—when courts started permitting parties to testify on
their own behalf.138 The objective theory persisted—according to Perillo—because
of the legal profession’s distrust of the testimony of parties, and the modern
objective theory thus arose as a response to the relaxed rules of evidence permitting
parties to testify.139
While the two views might differ about whether the objective theory was
present from time immemorial or was a product of the nineteenth century, there
was no doubt that by the late nineteenth century the objective theory prevailed over
a subjective theory.140 The objective theory of contract, however, was surely in some
132

Id. at 309.

133

O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 464 (1897).
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(1990).
135

Id. at 275 n.160.

136

Id. at 239.

137

Perillo, supra note 129, at 428.

138

Id. at 428–29.

139

Id. at 477.

140

See Lauren E. Miller, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Failure of the Objective Theory to Promote
Fairness in Language-Barrier Contracting, 43 Ind. L. Rev. 175, 177 (2009) (“Since

79

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

18:1 (2019)

tension with the will theory of contract, the latter focusing on autonomy and the
former focusing on what a reasonable person would believe was intended.141
I I I . S U MMA R Y O F H A N D ’ S A P P R O A C H T O T H E O B J E C T I V E T H E O R Y O F
C ON T R A C T I N T E R P R E T A T I ON

An analysis of Hand’s contract opinions (discussed in detail in the next section)
shows that Hand’s strain of objectivism was based on the belief that certainty is
necessary in contractual relations, rather than the will theory of contract. He aimed
to increase certainty in contractual relations by excluding what parties said to each
other during pre-contract negotiations leading to a written agreement, as well as
post-hoc declarations or admissions about their intentions. In this sense, he was in
fact a strong advocate of the objective theory of contract, but he was not a formalist
in the sense that he believed the rules of contract interpretation were derived from
the axiomatic principle of autonomy and a right to freedom of (and from) contract.
Rather, his support for the objective theory came from utilitarianism—a belief that
predictability is necessary in contractual arrangements.
While Hand shared classical contract law’s respect for the written contract, his
approach was different from classical contract law in the sense that he rejected the
idea that a contract’s provisions could have a plain meaning. He would not consider
evidence of what the parties said to each other during pre-contract negotiations and
what the parties subjectively intended, and thus not all extrinsic evidence was fair
game. But he otherwise aimed to implement the parties’ intentions through
consideration of any other relevant evidence, believing that the understanding of
the parties should count rather than the understanding of others.142 While he
believed that the words chosen “are always the most important evidence of the
parties’ intention,”143 he also sought to determine their intentions through a
consideration of all other relevant extrinsic evidence. Thus, while he was a strong
advocate of the objective theory of contract, in determining what a reasonable
person would believe the parties intended he was willing to consider much evidence
outside the written document.
the late nineteenth century, courts have applied the objective theory to determine which
manifestations amount to assent to form a contract.”).
141

See Nicholas C. Dranias, Consideration as Contract: A Secular Natural Law of Contracts, 12 Tex.
Rev. L. & Pol. 267, 296, 297 (2008) (“The theoretical justifications for the objective theory were
largely pragmatic reactions to the purported problems of the will theory.”).
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An analysis of Hand’s opinions discloses that he rejected the declarations by the
parties about what they thought the contract meant because he believed it usurped
the court’s (or jury’s) function in deciding what the parties’ understanding was and
because unexpressed intent is irrelevant. This former basis was consistent with
Hand’s (and classical legal thought’s) general respect for separation of powers. The
latter basis flowed from his belief—consistent with the other leading advocates of
the objective theory at the time—of the importance of parties being able to rely on
the apparent terms of a contract. Hand made it clear that excluding testimony
about what the parties believed the contract meant was necessary to avoid
uncertainty with respect to the interpretation of contracts. Importantly, however,
Hand did not reject that particular type of evidence because he believed what the
parties intended was irrelevant; he simply believed that unexpressed intentions were
irrelevant. In fact, he maintained that if it appears from the parties’ words or acts
that they attributed a peculiar meaning to a term, that meaning would prevail.
With respect to what the parties expressed to each other during negotiations
before reducing the agreement to writing, Hand rejected this evidence because he
believed that when parties integrated their agreement, they intended the written
document to exclude evidence of what the parties said during negotiations about
its meaning. Hand viewed this as an application of the parol evidence rule, stating
that “[t]he parol evidence rule means only this: That where the parties have in any
form said that a writing shall completely embody their engagements, the court can
enforce none but the written stipulations without disregarding the very contract
they have made.”144
I V . L E A R N E D H A N D ’ S OP I N I ON S ON C ON T R A C T I N T E R P R E T A T I ON

The discussion in this section is organized into four subsections. The first
section is an analysis of Hand’s opinion in Hotchkiss and his approach to
unexpressed understandings. The second section is an analysis of Hand’s opinion
in Eustis Mining and his approach to post-hoc admissions and expressed but
unincorporated intentions. The third section is an analysis of the role of contextual
evidence in Hand’s approach to contract interpretation, and his rejection of the
belief that words can have a plain meaning outside of their context. The fourth
section is an analysis of Hand’s decision in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., and
his approach to inferring promises.

144

In re Canfield, 190 F. 266, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), rev’d on other grounds, 193 F. 934 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d
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A. Hotchkiss and Unexpressed Understandings
A review of the Hotchkiss opinion in its entirety, rather than just its famous
dictum, shows that Hand in that case was concerned with self-serving testimony by
one of the parties about how the parties to the contract allegedly understood the
terms.145 In Hotchkiss, the issue was whether a contract for clearance loans146
between a bank and (now bankrupt) stockbrokers provided that securities
purchased with the loans would be subject to a lien as collateral for the loans.147
Hand’s famous dictum was in response to the testimony of a man named Carse,
whose testimony for the bank went further than the actual practice of the
stockbrokers and the bank (they had done business for many years), which Hand
had already concluded did not support the finding of a lien.148 Carse testified as to
what the stockbrokers and the bank understood the legal status of the securities to
be, testifying as follows:
It [the practice between the stockbrokers and the bank] has developed a form of trust,
and the clear understanding implied between the broker and the bank is that whatever
the broker obtains by the proceeds of the loan given to him is held in trust for the
account of the bank. . . . If a broker pays for stocks or bonds, it is the understanding of
the bank that they belong to them as collateral to their loan, and the broker simply
retains possession of them long enough to make delivery and get payment . . . .149

Hand stated that the testimony was not competent evidence because “it in
effect usurps the court’s function which is to decide what was the ‘clear
understanding.’”150 Hand, however, not wanting to imply that the parties’ actual
understanding was relevant, even to the court, held that it was “of no consequence
for another and deeper reason,” and explained:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent
of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known
intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used
the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes
upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something
145

See generally Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v.
Mechanics’ Metals Nat. Bank of City of N.Y., 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l City Bank
v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913).

146
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else of the sort.151

While the phrase “usual meaning which the law imposes upon them” might lead one
to believe Hand was referring to a provision’s “plain meaning,” such a belief is belied
by Hand’s earlier analysis in the case. Hand, though stating that he was proceeding
on the “assum[ption] that the written contracts may be varied by proof of a custom,”152
had considered extensively the parties’ practices in seeking to determine the
contract’s meaning.153 This shows that he likely meant usual meaning based not
only on the language used, but by also taking into account the deal’s context.
Also, Hand’s famous dictum did not stop there, and he added the following
qualification, which is often omitted when Hand’s dictum is quoted154: “[o]f course,
if it appear by other words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a peculiar
meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that meaning will prevail, but
only by virtue of the other words, and not because of their unexpressed intent.”155
Thus, “[w]hat must be rejected, according to Hand, is not the notion of intent, but
rather, testimony based upon intent that was unexpressed [either verbally or
through prior actions] at the time the contract is alleged to have been formed.”156
But Hand also made clear that the parties’ subjective intentions of the meaning
of their prior actions were irrelevant. What was important was how the court
believed a reasonable person would interpret those acts:
Now, in the case at bar, whatever was the understanding in fact of the banks, and of the
brokers, too, for that matter, of the legal effect of this practice between them, it is of not
the slightest consequence, unless it took form in some acts or words, which, being reasonably
interpreted, would have such meaning to ordinary men. Of course, it will be likely that, if they
both do understand their acts in the same way, usual men would have done so, too. Yet
the question always remains for the court to interpret the reasonable meaning to the
acts of the parties, by word or deed, and no characterization of its effect by either party
thereafter, however truthful, is material. The rights and obligations depend upon the

151

Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293.
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Id. at 290–92.

154
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law alone.157

Hand thus disregarded this portion of Carse’s testimony because the parties’
understanding “was expressed only in acts, the natural meaning of which does not
imply any trust relation, as he, and perhaps they, may have supposed.”158 Hand
noted that “[h]ad they said that they meant to create a trust, such a trust would arise;
but when they merely adopted a course of conduct, the supposed results of that
conduct are immaterial.”159
In 1928, Hand reiterated the often-overlooked qualifying point to his Hotchkiss
dictum, noting that it was relevant whether something was “disclosed to change the
normal meaning of the words.”160 In 1939, Hand wrote that although
with few exceptions the law attaches legal consequences to what parties do, quite
independently of their private purpose or intent . . . . [i]t is of course always possible that
the parties to . . . a written contract, may agree between themselves that it shall not have
the effect upon their rights or obligations which it purports to have . . . . It is not
necessary that such a mutual understanding shall be explicit or verbal; it may be
gathered from the conduct of the parties in a series of transactions, or in any other
way.161

In 1927, when Hand was on the Second Circuit, he provided insight into his
famous dictum in Hotchkiss, revealing that it was based on the need for
predictability in contractual arrangements.162 In United Constr. Co. v. Havermill, two
towns and a contractor entered into a contract for the building of a bridge.163 After
the bridge was built, a pier gave way and sank, wrecking the bridge.164 The towns
sued for breach, arguing that the defendant had failed to excavate for the piers to
“solid ledge,” as required by the contract, and this was the cause of the piers giving
way.165 Hand held that “[p]erhaps it was natural for the contractor to conclude that
the bed alone was intended, and to stop there; but that was not what he undertook
when he agreed that the ‘excavation . . . shall be done to the line shown.’”166 In the
final paragraph of the opinion, Hand stated:
157
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So far as we can see, the contractor ignored the terms of his contract and substituted
what he, perhaps correctly, supposed was everybody’s understanding. It was a natural,
but a perilous, course, and, having adopted it, the loss must fall where the words of the
contract put it. Contracts are written to avoid such uncertainties, and, however hardly they
may bear, we have no choice but to make them the measure of the parties’ obligations.167

Hand thus made it clear that he followed the objective theory of contract, even in
the face of what might have been both parties’ actual (but unexpressed)
understanding, because contracts were written to avoid such uncertainties. In 1940,
he similarly wrote that “[t]he purpose of a contract is to define the promised
performance, so that when it becomes due, the parties may know the extent to
which the promisor is bound . . . .”168 As recognized by a commentator, “[b]y
requiring evidence beyond contested, post hoc descriptions of the parties’ earlier
states of mind, the system is able to increase the reliability of its decision-making
process.”169
B. Eustis Mining, Post-Hoc Admissions, and Expressed but Unincorporated
Intentions
Hand’s second famous opinion espousing the objective theory of contract
interpretation—Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co.170—involved Hand’s
rejection of the relevance of a post-hoc damaging admission by a party about his
state of mind, as well as evidence of what the parties disclosed about their intentions
prior to or at contract formation, but that were not incorporated into the written
contract.
In Eustis Mining, the parties entered into an agreement in 1914 under which
Eustis would provide cinders to Beer for ten years.171 The agreement was set forth
in two contracts, and the first contract provided for Eustis to supply the amount
requested by Beer up to stated maximum amounts, but the second contract (which
was a subsequent letter written over four months later) provided that Beer would
purchase all of Eustis’s production.172 After the parties entered into the agreement,
the First World War caused a substantial increase in Eustis’s production because its
production of cinders was tied to ore from sulphur producers, and the demand for

167
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sulphuric acid was greatly increased.173 The issue was whether Beer was required to
take all of Eustis’s production, or whether it was limited to 12,000 tons.174 The
relevant language in the second contract was as follows: “[I]t has been agreed
between us that we purchase from you for a period of ten (10) years beginning from
July 1, 1914, and ending July 1, 1924, your total production of lump cinder, estimated
to be twelve thousand (12,000) tons per year . . . .”175
The specific issue was whether the phrase “estimated to be twelve thousand
(12,000) tons per year” limited the obligation to that amount.176 It was undisputed
that if just the language in the second contract was considered, the agreement
would require the defendant to take all of the plaintiff’s output.177 The defendant
argued, however, that construed in conjunction with the first contract it either
became apparent that the limitation was intended, or that it created an ambiguity
such that extrinsic evidence of the parties’ meaning was admissible.178
With respect to reading the two contracts together, Hand noted that it was
undisputed that the second contract, read alone, “would have bound the defendant
to accept the total output, regardless of its amount.”179 In addressing whether this
meaning could be changed by considering the first contract, Hand wrote that “we
must recognize, not only that there is a critical breaking point . . . beyond which no
language can be forced, but that in approaching that limit the strain increases.”180
Hand thus affirmed his belief that the most important aspect of contract
interpretation was the words the parties chose. Hand’s review of the two contracts
led him to conclude that the defendant “was ready to take all that it could get.”181
Hand then turned to the extrinsic evidence upon which the defendant relied.
First, the defendant wanted the court to consider a “Proposed Combination
Agreement of April 8, 1915,” which was a document written by the plaintiff and
apparently designed to subsume the two existing contracts, and that included the
provision from the first contract with its quantity limitation.182 Although the
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defendant never assented to the proposed combination agreement, the defendant
wanted to use this evidence to show what the plaintiff had intended with respect to
the second contract.183 Hand, however, would not consider it, even though it was
written evidence sought to be used by the defendant as evidence of what the
plaintiff intended, rather than simply self-serving testimony by one party of what
the parties understood the contract to mean, like the evidence in Hotchkiss.184 Hand
explained:
This evidence is, I think, irrelevant to the issues, for a reason going to the very nature of
a contractual obligation. It is quite true that we commonly speak of a contract as a
question of intent, and for most purposes it is a convenient paraphrase, accurate
enough, but, strictly speaking, untrue. It makes not the least difference whether a
promisor actually intends that meaning which the law will impose upon his words. The
whole House of Bishops might satisfy us that he had intended something else, and it
would make not a particle of difference in his obligation. That obligation the law
attaches to his act of using certain words, provided, of course, the actor be under no
disability. The scope of those words will, in the absence of some convention to the
contrary, be settled, it is true, by what the law supposes men would generally mean when
they used them; but the promisor’s conformity to type is not a factor in his obligation.
Hence it follows that no declaration of the promisor as to his meaning when he used the words is
of the slightest relevancy, however formally competent it may be as an admission. Indeed, if both
parties severally declared that their meaning had been other than the natural meaning, and each
declaration was similar, it would be irrelevant, saving some mutual agreement between them to
that effect. When the court came to assign the meaning to their words, it would disregard
such declarations, because they related only to their state of mind when the contract
was made, and that has nothing to do with their obligations. This is, of course, a wholly
different question from a preceding or subsequent agreement assigning an agreed
meaning to any given words used in another contract.185

Hand thus went beyond Hotchkiss and the concern about a self-serving
declaration, holding that a damaging admission (even a written admission) by a
party as to his or her intent regarding the contract’s meaning was irrelevant, even
if it showed the parties shared the same understanding.186 Hand’s use of the phrase
“severally declared” was important because it showed he rejected the relevance of
separate declarations by the parties of what they intended the contract to mean,
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even if the declarations disclosed a shared understanding. To be effective, such a
shared understanding must be part of a prior or subsequent agreement assigning
that shared understanding to the given words. This requirement of an agreement
can be viewed as a significant limitation on Hand’s qualifying remark in Hotchkiss
that “if it appear[s] by other words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a
peculiar meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that meaning will
prevail . . . .”187
The defendant also relied on evidence of the negotiations that attended the
execution of the second contract.188 One might suspect this would be the type of
evidence satisfying Hand’s requirement that a shared understanding be part of a
prior or subsequent agreement assigning that agreed meaning to the given words.
But Hand refused to consider this evidence as well:
Since the parties certainly intended, as appears by the mere character of the document,
to make out of the writing a definitive memorial of their words, that intent the law will
effect, and it can do so only by disregarding everything but the writing itself. Hence all
other verbal expression must be eliminated; the writing is agreed upon as the final
verbal act. The ambiguity of the written language does not determine this question in
any way whatever, in spite of some occasional confusion of language in the books; but
the exclusion of such negotiations depends upon their agreement to exclude, and
extends so far as the parties have agreed that it shall exclude all but the written words,
and no further. In the case at bar it is plain enough that the parties meant not to rely on
the oral negotiations; that they wished to have a complete and final written memorial
of their obligations. That purpose, being lawful, the court will fulfill by disregarding all
other verbal expression, except that selected.189

This too can be seen as a significant limitation on Hand’s qualifying remark in
Hotchkiss that would permit a showing that the parties attributed a peculiar
meaning to their contract.190
A year after Eustis Mining, Hand reaffirmed his belief that the language chosen
187
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for the written contract trumps the parties’ contrary indications of intent. In 1918,
in United States v. Republic Bag & Paper Co.,191 Hand, sitting on the Second Circuit
while still a trial judge, wrote the majority opinion finding that a contract between
the government and a paper company was not to be construed as a requirements
contract, despite language in a proposal suggesting that was the intention.192 The
proposal, standing alone, indicated that the government desired a requirements
contract.193 But the contract itself stated that the paper company was to
“furnish . . . so much of the estimated quantity [of paper] as may be ordered by the
party of the second part (the Public Printer).”194 Hand wrote that “[t]he
plaintiff . . . very properly argues that the contract is not to be taken by itself, but in
conjunction with the Public Printer’s proposal,”195 which had been attached to the
contract.196 But he then noted, however, that the proposal and the contract
conflicted and that “we must adopt that which occurs in the actual understanding
of the parties, rather than in their preliminary negotiations. Therefore we conclude
that the contract proper should prevail.”197 Hand continued: “Just why the contract
varied from the proposals we cannot, of course, surmise, but we cannot with justice
disregard the fact that it did vary . . . .”198
In 1945, Hand reiterated his opposition to the use of what the parties said
during negotiations as evidence of a term’s meaning.199 In Rothkopf v. Lowry & Co.,200
he stated that “as an interpretative gloss upon the meaning of the words actually
used, that testimony was incompetent, for the contract was plainly to be a final
memorial of the promises . . . .”201 Rather, Hand relied on “the underlying purpose
of the contract” to determine the language’s meaning.202 Hand apparently only
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relented when required to follow state law. In 1949, following New York law in the
post-Erie era, he wrote: “[T]he law of New York—to which we must look to learn the
meaning of the contract—admits previous negotiations to show [the term’s]
meaning . . . .”203
Hand’s refusal to consider statements of the parties’ intentions made during
negotiations preceding a written contract was consistent with Williston’s approach,
which was based on the idea that when parties adopt a writing as a statement of
their bargain, they intend to exclude such evidence.204 In such a situation, “[t]he
parties have assented to those words as binding upon them.”205 Williston wrote that
“[w]here . . . they incorporate their agreement into a writing they have attempted
more than to assent by means of symbols to certain things, they have assented to the
writing as the adequate expression of the things to which they agree.”206 Williston again
expressed this view in the Restatement of Contracts, published in 1932. The Restatement
provided that the interpretation of an integrated agreement should take into
account “all operative usages and . . . all the circumstances prior to and
contemporaneous with the making of the integration, other than oral statements by
the parties of what they intended it to mean.”207 Williston, Reporter for the Restatement
of Contracts, wrote that where parties
integrate their agreement they have attempted more than to assent by means of
symbols to certain things. They have assented to the writing as the expression of the
things to which they agree, therefore the terms of the writing are conclusive, and a
contract may have a meaning different from that which either party supposed it to
have.208

Thus, for Hand and Williston, it was the parol evidence rule and Thayer’s
merger rationale that precluded the use of statements made by the parties as proof
of the parties’ intentions, even (at least for Hand) post-formation admissions of
what a party’s intent had been at the time of formation. Traditionally, direct
statements of intention had been excluded because of fear that they would be given
too great weight by the judge or the jury.209 For Hand, however, it was based on the
belief that the parties intended the written terms (as interpreted by a court) to
control over the parties’ beliefs about the contract’s meaning, even if the parties
203
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intended the same meaning.210 Hand did not place the written words above the
parties’ intentions, he believed the written words were the parties’ intentions. And
a “preceding . . . agreement assigning an agreed meaning to any given words used
in another contract” would not include agreements during negotiations that were
not included in a subsequent written contract because the failure to include them
indicated an intention to exclude them.
C. Rejection of Plain Meaning and the Importance of Context
Hand, however, although believing that the parties’ actual beliefs about a
written contract’s meaning were irrelevant, at the same time rejected the idea that
words have a plain meaning. Throughout his judicial career, Hand demonstrated
he was willing to admit other extrinsic evidence to determine meaning. As one
commentator notes, “Judge Hand . . . recognized that there were certain individual
transactions where strict standards of contract interpretation would not apply or
would be overcome.”211 In fact, Hand displayed this willingness to find ambiguity
and admit extrinsic evidence in his first notable contracts opinion in 1910, just a
year after joining the bench.
The opinion—Lorraine Manufacturing Co. v. Oshinsky212—was a denial of a motion
for a new trial.213 The case involved a claim for breach of a contract of sale, with the
plaintiff seller alleging that the goods were wrongfully rejected by the defendant
buyer.214 The defendant argued that the goods, delivered on November 16, were
delivered one day late.215 The issue was whether the following contract provision
required delivery on November 15: “Below we hand you copy of your order for
spring, 1908, which the mills have accepted, and which they will deliver to
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This aspect of Hand’s approach to contract interpretation—deeming irrelevant an admission
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you * * * at the specified dates: * * * Stock: Nov. 15.”216
Hand had apparently permitted oral testimony about the provision’s meaning
(the details of the testimony are not provided), and the jury thereafter returned a
verdict for the plaintiff.217 The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that
admitting the testimony was error because the contract language was “too clear to
require any oral explanation.”218 Hand displayed little difficulty holding that the
provision was ambiguous and that oral explanation about the provision was
admissible, relying primarily on his own judgment about common speech rather
than case law precedent.219 He explained that when persons intend to specify a
specific date, they say “on July 4th,” not “at July 4th,” and that when persons use the
phrase “at Christmas” or “at Easter” they imply a certain latitude regarding the
date.220 Hand did not conclude that “at . . . November 15th” necessarily meant there
was such latitude, only that there was doubt about its meaning and that it was a jury
question, with extrinsic evidence admissible because of the ambiguity.221
Interestingly, Hand was reversed on appeal, the Second Circuit writing:
We think that the language of the provision is plain, unequivocal, and free from
ambiguity, and required delivery on November 15th, and not later. We fail to appreciate
the contention of the plaintiff that the language may fairly be given two meanings. A
provision for delivery at a specified date, followed by the specification of a date, requires
delivery upon that date and none other. The preposition ‘at’ seems quite as definite and
certain as any word that could be used. Consequently, as the goods were not delivered
or tendered until after November 15th, we think that the plaintiff failed to establish its
cause of action, and that judgment should have been directed for the defendants.222

Even if a contract provision seemed on its face to have a plain meaning, Hand
believed that extrinsic evidence was admissible to give the provision meaning,
maintaining that the literal meaning of a writing was not a reliable test.223 Forty
years after Oshinsky, Hand cited with approval the following Restatement comment:
The court in interpreting words or other acts of the parties puts itself in the position
which they occupied at the time the contract was made. In applying the appropriate
standard of interpretation even to an agreement that on its face is free from ambiguity
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it is permissible to consider the situation of the parties and the accompanying
circumstances at the time it was entered into—not for the purpose of modifying or
enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the meaning to be given to
the agreement.224

Throughout his career, Hand followed this approach. In 1927, in Crescent
Insulated Wire & Cable Co. v. Pratt Chuck Co., the issue involved the interpretation of a
satisfaction clause and when the parties intended title to pass under the contract.225
Hand stated that the court’s conclusion rested “both upon the language used and
the situation of the parties,” and he then described in detail the parties’ situation to
support the court’s interpretation,226 then stating that its conclusion was based
upon “the whole setting.”227 In 1928, in Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor
Car Co., Inc., Hand stated, with respect to a matter of contract interpretation, that
“the setting in which words are used . . . is always competent, and usually necessary,
to their understanding.”228 Hand therefore refused to interpret the contract at issue
based solely on its language, and without the aid of additional evidence.229
In 1929, in Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileird v. C. G. Blake Co., Hand stated
that “parties must always be assumed to refer, to the past transaction between
them . . . .”230 At issue in that particular case was a promise to deliver six “cargoes”
of coal and the amount the parties intended to be shipped.231 Hand held that
“‘[c]argoes’ meant cargoes as they had dealt in them, not as others had.”232 He then
stated that “[t]his is, of course, a very common way to ascertain the meaning of
language,” and that recourse to custom might have been necessary had there not
been such a course of dealing.233 With evidence of how the parties had treated the
term, Hand held that it was an error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the
issue of custom.234 In 1951, in Rumsey Manufacturing Corp. v. U.S. Hoffman Machinery
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Corp., Hand looked to a provision’s purpose in interpreting it.235 With respect to the
type of extrinsic evidence that would be relevant, Hand believed that it could be
anything “except [as previously discussed] what the parties said to each other
outside the writing.”236
Hand’s opinion in Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co. provides the clearest
insight into his belief about the interplay between the contract’s words being the
best evidence of the parties’ intentions and surrounding circumstances being
admissible to give meaning to those words.237 Hand held that “[a]ll the attendant
facts constituting the setting of a contract are admissible, so long as they are
helpful,” but the extent of their helpfulness is based on whether the language is
ambiguous and the extent of the ambiguity.238 Here, not only did Hand disclose a
willingness to consider the contract’s surrounding circumstances, he rejected the
idea that words can have a fixed meaning:
The admissibility of the general surroundings in which the contract was written
(Merriam v. U.S., 107 U.S. 437, 441, 2 Sup.Ct. 536, 27 L.Ed. 531), rests upon quite a different
basis [than the other extrinsic evidence relied on by the defendant], one which can be
said with a nearer approach to accuracy to turn upon the ambiguity of the written
words. All the attendant facts constituting the setting of a contract are admissible, so
long as they are helpful; the extent of their assistance depends upon the different
meanings which the language itself will let in. Hence we may say, truly perhaps, that, if
the language is not ambiguous, no evidence is admissible, meaning no more than that
it could not control the sense, if we did let it in; indeed, it might ‘contradict‘ the
contract—that is, the actual words should be remembered to have a higher probative
value, when explicit, than can safely be drawn by inference from surroundings. Yet, as
all language will bear some different meanings, some evidence is always admissible; the line of
exclusion depends on how far the words will stretch, and how alien is the intent they are asked to
include.239
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Hand was clear, however, that evidence of the general situation of the parties, to be
of assistance in understanding the meaning of their words, must have been
disclosed to each other.240
Hand’s rejection of the idea that words can have a plain meaning outside of
their context is perhaps best exemplified by his opinion in E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard
Steamship Co., in which Hand refused to apply contract language literally when it
conflicted with the contract’s purpose.241 In E. Gerli the libelant sued the respondent
for the loss of two bales of silk shipped on a steamship from Southampton to New
York.242 The respondent relied on a clause in the bill of lading providing that “[t]he
carrier is not liable . . . for any claim for short delivery of, or damage to, the property
hereby receipted for, unless notice of such claim is given in writing before removal
of . . . such part of the Goods as are discharged from the vessel at the port of discharge.”243
Hand recognized that:
Taken literally, this would mean, in case all the goods were discharged from the vessel,
and some were later lost on the pier, that the notice need never be given, because all
those discharged were never removed; and the clause would then cover only the case of
goods lost on board.244

Because it was usually impossible to prove whether goods were lost on board or after
discharge, Hand noted that the clause would usually have no effect.245 Hand thus
held that such a literal interpretation could not prevail:
It is indeed true that the language of a bill of lading must be taken against the carrier,
but it appears to us that the interpretation suggested would too plainly contradict its
purpose. Therefore, we read the phrase, ‘discharged from the vessel,’ as meaning not
that the goods have merely gone over the ship’s side to the wharf, but that they have been
delivered to the shipper. Anything else, for the reasons just given, would upon most
occasions delete it from the contract, and cannot be thought to be its meaning.246

Hand then held that “it would seem to be the only fair meaning of the clause that if
he [the shipper] knows of the shortage, he must give notice at least before taking

evidence of surroundings is always admissible. Its operative effect depends on how far the words
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that which he understands to be the last installment.”247 In 1945 Hand, in the context
of statutory interpretation, reiterated this point, writing:
[I]t is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily
the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a
contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes
always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.248

Hand also had no difficulty deviating from a language’s literal meaning when
the parties had acted in a way consistent with a different meaning. In Town of
Readsboro v. Hoosac Tunnell & W. R. Co.,249 the town and the defendant’s predecessor
(who owned a railroad) entered into a contract under which the parties agreed to
share equally the expense of maintaining a bridge.250 The predecessor conveyed the
railroad to the defendant, and the defendant promised to comply with all contracts
binding on the predecessor.251 The defendant argued that the contract between the
town and the defendant’s predecessor was ultra vires, and thus the defendant had
no obligation to comply with it because the defendant only promised to assume
those obligations that were “binding” on the predecessor.252 Hand, however,
rejected this argument, even if the original contract had not been binding on the
predecessor:
We do not forget that in each deed the grantee undertakes to assume only those
obligations which are “binding” upon the grantor, and that strictly the contract was
binding on the Deerfield River Company only in case it was intra vires. Yet it is plain,
from the subsequent conduct of the parties, that by that language they meant to include
the contract in suit among the obligations of the Deerfield River Company which its two
successors assumed. We think it too late now to raise the question whether as matter
of strict construction the Deerfield River Company was originally bound. Hence, even
though the original contract was ultra vires, an action lies as upon a new promise made
for the benefit of a third person . . . .253

Similarly, a year later, in Nolte v. Hudson Navigation Co.,254 Hand held that
ambiguous language would be construed in accordance with how the parties
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treated it during the life of the contract, writing:
At least, when parties choose such equivocal language, they must be content with the
interpretation which they put upon it immediately thereafter, and to which they
continuously adhered for nearly 25 years. While the new pier and bulkhead were
building, the company asserted its right under the contract to a new shed located
relatively to the new bulkhead as the old shed was located relatively to the old bulkhead,
and the city assented, not as the grant of a new right, but as something included within
the old.
Nobody read any other meaning into the words until this claim was filed, and everybody
concerned acted on the assumption that the first interpretation had been right. The
canon of contemporaneous and subsequent construction of a contract
applies . . . . Hence we conclude that the contract meant to give the company, for the
maintenance of the new shed, whatever rights it had had to maintain the old shed.255

Thus, consistent with Hand’s concern for predictability in contractual relations, if
the parties had engaged in a course of performance that suggested a shared
understanding, that shared understanding would control. Hand obviously believed
this was different from post-formation admissions about meaning, which had not
been acted upon.
For Hand, the parties’ purpose in entering into the contract or including a
particular provision was important. Consider the following from a 1953 opinion:
[A]lthough they were used of a statute, the often quoted words of Holmes, J. apply with
even greater force to a contract: “The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a
statute, the change of policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms,
but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving
at, but you have not said it, and we shall go on as before.” It is as impossible to lay down
any postulates for ‘strict construction’ as it is for ordinary ‘construction.’ When parties
have not explicitly covered the occasion which has arisen, a court will always strive to
ascertain whether their disclosed purpose does not demand a more inclusive ‘intent.’
And by their ‘intent’ we can understand nothing else than how they would have disposed
of the occasion had they been faced with it at the outset. There is a hazard about doing
that; but it is inevitable if the purpose is not often to be defeated and all courts do it
more or less. When we say that we will adopt a ‘strict construction,’ we mean that we
will press with unusual persistence the doubts that cannot but inhere in the function
anyway, and that we will be satisfied with no extension of the literal meaning unless it
satisfies every logical compunction.256

If, however, context did not support a party’s argument much, it would not
override the meaning suggested by the contract language chosen by the parties. For
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example, returning to Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co.,257 Hand found in
that case that the general surroundings did not support the defendant’s argument
much, and that the language of the contract indicated no limit on quantity:
I agree that the production occasioned by the Great War was a surprise to both sides,
and that it was not within their forecast of the future. It is altogether likely that the
defendant would have cried off upon the whole bargain, had they thought it probable.
Contracts cannot, however, be treated so loosely; if parties wish more certainty, they
must use more certain words. The case, therefore, ends where it starts, with the initial
acceptance clause as the best indication of what the meaning was; it admits of no
interpretation which does not distort it beyond what the words will bear.258

Thus, if the parties wanted more certainty regarding the amount of output, “they
must use more certain words.”259
Hand therefore rejected the idea that words can have a plain meaning outside
of the context in which they are used. As previously discussed, he would enforce an
agreement where the words would have a peculiar meaning, provided that the
parties had made such an agreement. But Hand was also willing to consider a broad
array of other evidence in determining meaning, provided that the words were
sufficiently susceptible of the meaning proposed. He made clear that surrounding
circumstances were always relevant, and that a requirement of ambiguity meant no
more than that the extrinsic evidence, if admitted, must be capable of giving the
language the asserted meaning. Hand would also enforce a shared understanding
of a contract’s meaning when the parties had acted upon that meaning. And when
deciding whether the words were sufficiently susceptible to the meaning proposed,
Hand was willing to find an agreement to give words a meaning that conflicted with
their literal meaning.
D. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc. and Implied Promises
Hand also had little difficulty using context to find an implied promise, as he
showed in 1910, just a year after joining the bench. In Colgate v. James T. White &
Co.,260 the parties entered into a contract under which the plaintiff agreed to provide
the defendant with information about the plaintiff’s life for use in a cyclopedia.261
The plaintiff thereafter sought an injunction to prevent the information from being
used, arguing that the defendant had represented that the cyclopedia would be
257
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issued under the auspices of the U.S. Government, and that it was in fact to be
published in a cyclopedia that was not under such auspices.262 Hand found the
defendant promised to publish the biography in a cyclopedia under the auspices of
the U.S. Government, noting that the defendant “let the interview proceed after it
would have been apparent to any reasonable man that Colgate was acting under a
misapprehension, and supposed that the facts would not be published in the usual
kind of biography.”263 Hand then found that this promise implied a negative
covenant to not publish it elsewhere, stating that “[t]he commonest good faith
requires the implication that he would not abuse the opportunity so given him by
publishing them in a work which he from the outset found it necessary to assure
Colgate that this was not.”264
In Moon Motor Car Co.,265 Hand stated that the fact that a contract did not
include an express promise to sell would not be final as to whether there was such a
commitment.266 He cited, in addition to other cases, Benjamin Cardozo’s famous
opinion in Wood v. Duff-Gordon, in which the New York Court of Appeals inferred a
promise to use best efforts to market products.267 And in one case Hand found an
implied promise to forbear in exchange for a lien, stating:
It is quite true that here there was no express reference to forbearance in the contract
and no statement that the lien was in exchange for it, but the situation reasonably
implied that the parties so intended it. . . . The cause of its inaction was the promised
lien; it cannot be supposed that the connection between that inaction and the
agreement to give security was wholly unconscious.268

But Hand’s most famous opinion dealing with implied promises is his 1933
opinion in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., in which he refused to infer a promise
by a subcontractor to keep its bid open long enough for a general contractor to rely
on the bid in obtaining the prime contract and then accept the subcontractor’s
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offer.269 This opinion has been described as “purely formalistic,”270 “a model of the
formalistic application of contract doctrine”271 and “a pillar of traditional, formal,
Willistonian contract analysis.”272 According to one commentator, this was a case
in which “Hand viewed the commercial transaction at issue through the lens of
individualism and formalism”273 and resting “on the twin related ideological
insights of ‘protect yourself’ and ‘indifference’; in other words, the central tenets of
atomistic individualism embodied in the law of contracts.”274 In fact, the opinion
was even too Willistonian for Williston.275 Several years later, Hand’s former
professor rejected the result in the second edition of his treatise published in 1936.276
One commentator wrote in 1990 that Hand’s opinion in Baird “died on the vine.
Even now, fifty-seven years later, not a single decision follows it.”277
Baird arose out of a subcontractor who submitted a bid to general contractors
for all the linoleum needed for a public building project, the bid being subject to
“prompt acceptance” after the general contractor was awarded the prime
contract.278 The subcontractor, however, had underestimated the amount of
linoleum required by the specifications.279 A general contractor used the
subcontractor’s bid in calculating its own bid for the prime contract.280 When the
269
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subcontractor learned of its mistake, it telegraphed the general contractor, but the
telegram was not received until after the general contractor had submitted its bid
for the prime contract.281 The deadline for submitting bids to the public authorities
had passed, and because the linoleum was just a small part of the whole project, and
a withdrawal of the general contractor’s bid would have cost it the prime contract
and probably resulted in the forfeiture of its deposit, the general contractor did not
withdraw its bid.282 The public authorities accepted the general contractor’s bid,
and the general contractor then attempted to accept the subcontractor’s bid, but the
subcontractor refused to recognize a contract.283 The general contractor then sued
the subcontractor for breach.284 The general contractor argued that when it used
the subcontractor’s bid, “they accepted the [subcontractor’s] offer and promised to
pay for the linoleum, in case their bid was accepted.”285
Citing to the Restatement (First) of Contracts, Hand began his analysis by stating
the general rule that an offer must be accepted before it is revoked, noting that the
acceptance was therefore too late “[u]nless there are circumstances to take it out of
the ordinary doctrine . . . .”286 Hand viewed the case as one involving the
interpretation of the transaction, “and the question is merely as to what they meant;
that is, what is to be imputed to the words they used.”287
Hand rejected the argument that the general contractor accepted the
subcontractor’s offer merely by putting in a bid to the public authorities.288 Hand
relied on the fact that there would be no claim for breach against the general
contractor if the general contractor repudiated the prime contract, or went
bankrupt, after being awarded it.289 Also, the subcontractor’s bid stated that it was
only available for acceptance upon being awarded the prime contract,290 and its
reference to the bid being subject to “prompt acceptance” after being awarded the
prime contract indicated “the usual communication of an acceptance, and
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precludes the idea that the use of the offer in the bidding shall be the equivalent.”291
Hand noted that “[i]t may indeed be argued that this last language contemplated no
more than an early notice that the offer had been accepted, the actual acceptance
being the bid, but that would wrench its natural meaning too far . . . .”292 Hand then
noted that “[t]he contractors had a ready escape from their difficulty by insisting
upon a contract before they used the figures; and in commercial transactions it does
not in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who
do not protect themselves.”293
This portion of Hand’s opinion is uncontroversial, as the general rule to this day
is that a general contractor’s use of a subcontractor’s bid is not an acceptance,
absent a contrary agreement between the parties.294 In fact, this is true even if the
subcontractor states that any use of its bid by the general contractor is an
acceptance.295
The plaintiff also argued, however, that even if a bilateral contract had not
formed, the defendant should be liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.296
Hand rejected the argument, holding that an offer is not a promise because “an offer
for an exchange is not meant to become a promise until a consideration has been
received, either a counter-promise or whatever else is stipulated.”297 The
subcontractor’s offer would become “a promise to deliver” only “when the plaintiff
promised to take and pay for it.”298 Merely using the bid was a matter of indifference
to the subcontractor and not what it was seeking in return.299 Without a promise
by the subcontractor, there was “no room . . . for the doctrine of ‘promissory
estoppel.’”300
Hand also held that the offer could not be considered an option, making the
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offer irrevocable and giving the general contractor the power, after being awarded
the prime contract, to either accept the offer or get a better deal from another
subcontractor.301 Hand stated that “[t]here is not the least reason to suppose that
the defendant meant to subject itself to such a one-sided obligation.”302 As noted by
a commentator, “In justifying the result in Baird, Hand maintained his vision of
freedom of contract. He would not force commercial actors into agreements that
they did not wish to enter.”303 Hand acknowledged, however, that if the
subcontractor’s bid could be construed as including a promise to keep the offer
open, the doctrine of promissory estoppel might apply.304
Although Hand’s opinion is viewed as formalistic, this ignores important parts
of Hand’s analysis. Critics view Hand’s analysis as simply implementing a
formalistic syllogism as follows:
Major premise = An offer can be revoked before an acceptance, unless the offeror
promises to keep it open.
Minor premise = The subcontractor did not promise to keep its offer open.
Conclusion = The subcontractor could revoke its offer before the general contractor
accepted it.

What is often overlooked, however, is that Hand was willing to entertain the use of
promissory estoppel if the subcontractor had promised to keep the offer open, but
the circumstances of the transaction suggested that the subcontractor had not
made such an implied promise, as it would open the subcontractor up to a “onesided obligation.”305 Before Hand would infer such an obligation, he expected, as
always, some extrinsic evidence that the parties intended that obligation, and there
was no evidence the subcontractor intended to be subject to such a one-sided
obligation. In fact, Hand’s opinion in Baird has been cited as an example of his belief
that contracting parties can adapt quite well to formal categories so long as the
application of such categories remains clear and stable, and that substantive
approaches [to contract interpretation], especially when applied by nonspecialist judges
operating at a distance from the commercial setting and susceptible to influence by a
host of popular and ideological considerations, tend to undermine the certainty of
exchange and to defeat the parties' intentions.306

301

Id.

302

Id.

303

Konefsky, supra note 270, at 1202.

304

James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346.

305

Id.

306

Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum.
L. Rev. 496, 501 (2004).

103

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

18:1 (2019)

In fact, a study of the industry determined that general contractors themselves
do not want to be bound until after they are awarded the prime contract, and
There is evidence that the principle reason why a general [contractor] might wish to
preserve freedom of action is to be in a position to ‘shop’ or ‘peddle’ the particular sub’s
offer, after securing the contract for the main job.”307

The study’s author concluded
that a legal rule making the sub’s offer irrevocable [in a case in which a subcontractor
revoked the offer because of a rise in the cost of materials] was not needed and would
put subs at a still greater disadvantage, and that it would be wiser to leave the problem
to be worked out by voluntary action of the interested parties.308

This suggests that Hand’s reluctance to infer a promise without sufficient evidence,
and to leave the matter to agreement between the parties, was the correct
response.309
As recognized by one commentator, it was the lack of evidence to infer a
promise that in one respect distinguishes Hand’s opinion in Baird from the contrary
holding by Justice Roger Traynor in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.:
Evidence or absence of evidence of business usage explains in part why
Learned Hand thought the general contractor in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers,
Inc. was foolish for relying on the subcontractor’s bid before entering into a bilateral
contract with the subcontractor, but Roger Traynor found that the general contractor’s
reliance in Drennan v. Star Paving Co. was “reasonable” and “foreseeable.” In Drennan,
the “plaintiff testified that it was customary in that area for general contractors to
receive the bids of subcontractors by telephone on the day set for bidding and to rely
on them in computing their own bids.” In Baird, there was no evidence that, as a matter
307
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of trade usage, contractors relied on subcontractors’ bids.310

Thus, Hand was willing to infer a promise if there was sufficient evidence to infer a
promise, but he was unwilling to infer a promise as a matter of policy in the absence
of such evidence.
Even Justice Traynor in Drennan seemingly acknowledged the court was
abandoning notions of agreement and implementing social policy, stating that
“[w]hether implied in fact or law, the subsidiary promise [to not revoke the offer]
serves to preclude the injustice that would result if the offer could be revoked after
the offeree had acted in detrimental reliance thereon.”311 Traynor was apparently
willing to infer such a promise as a matter of law if there was insufficient evidence
to infer it from the facts. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which adopts Drennan
as black letter, as much as admits any such promise is implied in law, making no
reference to an implied promise to keep the offer open but referring to foreseeable
reliance on the offer.312 For Hand, it was not the courts’ role in contracts cases such
as Baird to implement such social policy, since the parties had the ability to protect
themselves.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of Hand’s opinions involving contract interpretation, rather than
simply relying on his famous dicta about the objective theory of contract, shows that
Hand’s reputation as a great commercial formalist lawyer with a crusader’s zeal for
the objective theory of contract is an overly simplistic view of his approach to
contract interpretation. Hand believed certainty in the interpretation of contracts
was vital and that courts should ultimately determine a contract’s meaning based
primarily on the contract’s words. He rejected, however, the notion that words can
have a plain meaning outside of their context, and he believed that the contract’s
meaning should be based on what a reasonable person would believe the parties
intended.
In determining meaning, the court should consider many types of evidence,
including the contract’s purpose, the surrounding circumstances, and how the
parties treated the particular contract term during performance. Hand simply
310
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believed that the language chosen was the best evidence of intent and believed that
at a certain point extrinsic evidence of meaning would be so at odds with the
language used that it would stretch the provision’s meaning to the breaking point.
But that breaking point was surprisingly far, such that he believed “at November
15”313 could be reasonably interpreted to mean “about November 15,”314 “discharged
from the vessel”315 could be reasonably interpreted to mean “delivered to the
shipper,”316 and “binding”317 obligations could be reasonably interpreted to include
a non-binding ultra vires contract.318 Hand’s reasonable person was not a strict
constructionist who simply looked at a contract’s four corners when interpreting a
contract.
Hand was also willing to infer promises, even relying on Cardozo’s famous
opinion in Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon.319 But he would only do so if he believed there
was sufficient evidence to infer them and was unwilling to infer a promise without
evidentiary support simply to save a party from the consequences of insufficient
foresight. He believed that it was the role of the legislatures and the parties, not that
of the courts, to protect parties from their failure to make their contractual
intentions clear to the other party.
Likewise, Hand’s rejection of the relevance of post-hoc declarations by the
parties of what they thought the contract meant was based on his belief that
predictability in contractual relations requires that contracts be created by
agreement, not undisclosed intentions. His position that statements made during
negotiations leading to a written contract were irrelevant was in fact his attempt to
effectuate the parties’ intentions—his belief that parties intend an integrated
agreement to supersede such negotiations, even when those negotiations suggested
a shared understanding.
While Hand did seem to exhibit a zeal for the objective theory of contract, some
of that apparent zeal is likely attributable to his original writing style and his desire
to clarify the law, which surely led to his memorable dicta. In any event, recognizing
that he had a zeal for the objective theory should not lead one to believe he shared
all of the characteristics commonly associated with formalism and classical contract
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law. His rejection of a constitutional right to freedom of contract, his belief that
language cannot have a plain meaning outside of its context, his willingness to
admit a broad array of contextual evidence to interpret contract language, and his
willingness to infer a promise when the evidence supported such an inference,
shows that his approach to contract interpretation was more modern than one
would expect from a so-called great commercial formalist lawyer with a crusader’s
zeal for the objective theory of contract.
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